Acquisition of Corporate Control By Numerous Privately Negotiated Transactions:  A Proposal for the Resolution of Street Sweeps by Stern, Yedidia Z.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 4 Article 3
4-1-1993
Acquisition of Corporate Control By Numerous
Privately Negotiated Transactions: A Proposal for
the Resolution of Street Sweeps
Yedidia Z. Stern
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Yedidia Z. Stern, Acquisition of Corporate Control By Numerous Privately Negotiated Transactions: A Proposal for the Resolution of Street
Sweeps, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 1195 (1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol58/iss4/3
ACQUISITION OF CORPORATE CONTROL BY
NUMEROUS PRIVATELY NEGOTIATED
TRANSACTIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF STREET SWEEPS
Yedidia Z. Stern*
INTRODUCTION
Corporate control' may be acquired by means of special
techniques regulated by law, such as a merger or tender offer, or
it may be effected by means of negotiating regular contracts for
the purchase of corporate shares from the owners. Within the
framework of the latter method of purchasing corporate control,
three scenarios may exist. In the first case, termed "private ac-
quisition of control," control is acquired by means of a private
transaction with a holder of controlling shares (or from a group
that has control and acts in concert with an identity of inter-
ests). The second case, the "open market purchase of control," is
the act of acquiring control by means of a series of anonymous
purchases of corporate shares on a stock exchange. In the third
case, the "street sweep" or "sweep, the purchase of control is
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University, Israel. LL.B. 1982, Bar-Ilan
University, Faculty of Law, S.J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School.
1 For the purposes of this Article, "control" is attributed to the person who owns
such a sufficient quantity of voting rights as to impose his business policy on the
corporation.
2 In legal jargon, the use of the term "street sweep" is not uniform. There are those
who use the term widely to describe open market purchases as well as privately negoti-
ated transactions. To differentiate between the two situations, this Article refers to open
market purchases as "market sweeps," and reserves the term "street sweeps" for private
transactions not conducted on an exchange.
There are those, however, who use the term "street sweep" narrowly to describe a
particular case of acquisition of control by way of private transactions off the exchange
after the failure of a tender offer. In that case, the raider who failed to acquire control
(usually as a result of defensive tactics adopted by the target corporation) can success-
fully acquire control by means of private transactions made with risk arbitrageurs and
with a number of central shareholders in the corporation. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The
Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DuKE L.J. 202; Michael Ryngart et al.,
Shareholder Welfare and Substantial Acquisition Outside of the Williams Act, 1985
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 505. In this Article, I free the term from the narrow interpretation
and apply it to every case of acquisition of control by way of private, independent trans-
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effected through a series of unrelated private transactions, con-
cluded off the exchange, between the purchaser of control and a
large number of shareholders who have not coordinated their po-
sitions and as a result, have not previously wielded control of the
corporation. The focus of this Article is this third case of pri-
vately negotiated transactions for the acquisition of control.
In principle one may conceive of two factual situations in
which a sweep may be conducted to acquire corporate control. In
the first instance, the concentration of corporate share owner-
ship before the sweep is such that no shareholder holds suffi-
cient shares to allow him or her to secure control over the corpo-
ration. In this situation, the sweep process turns the
uncontrolled corporation' into a controlled one. In the second
case, the corporation is controlled before the sweep by a minor-
ity shareholder who holds de facto control of the corporation be-
cause a majority of the shares are dispersed among a wide range
of investors who have not coordinated their positions." In this
situation, the aim of the sweep is to concentrate in the hands of
the purchaser greater voting power than that held by the pre-
sent controller so that control passes to the purchaser even with-
out the cooperation of the current controller. However, acquisi-
tion of control by way of a sweep is not possible in a third
factual situation: where a shareholder owns the majority of the
voting power. In this case, the agreement of the majority share-
holder to sell his shares is a necessary condition for the transfer
of control to others.5
actions conducted off the exchange between the purchaser and a large number of
shareholders.
3 Professional management guides the operations of the uncontrolled corporation. It
is therefore accepted practice to classify control of such a corporation as "management
control." See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 5, 84-90 (rev. ed. 1968).
4 In such a scenario, control is referred to as "minority control." See BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 3, at 5, 84-90.
1 An exception is where the majority shareholder has no interest in running the
corporation. Since this type of control is only potential and not actual, the corporation
can be classified as uncontrolled. For example, one can imagine a corporation where the
majority of shares are held by a trust, a mutual fund or a financial institution that does
not participate directly in corporate governance. This phenomenon, known as institu-
tional investor passivity, enables an interested party to concentrate actual control of the
corporation by means of a sweep of shares from the community of minority shareholders.
For an analysis of the rational apathy of institutional investors, see John C. Coffee Jr.,
Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor (1991) (un-
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This Article examines the two-pronged question of whether
and how Congress should regulate a street sweep for acquisition
of corporate control. There is little substantive discussion on
sweeps in legal literature. Courts,' the Securities Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC")7 and scholars" focus mainly on the question of
the whether the federal tender offer regulation applies to street
sweep deals. Generally, they are not concerned with acquisition
of control by the sweep method itself. This Article attempts to
fill the lacuna by means of a systematic and analytical examina-
tion of street sweeps as a method of acquiring corporate control.
Part I describes existing relevant law. Statutory law does
not refer specifically to the subject of sweeps and, therefore, the
appropriateness of regulation is a matter of dispute. The SEC
supports subjecting sweeps to the statutory norms that regulate
tender offers because of the similarities between the two. How-
ever, most courts have rejected the SEC approach and refused to
apply tender offer regulations to street sweeps. 10 Generally,
courts see no cause for distinguishing between sweeps and regu-
lar purchases of shares on or off a stock exchange. In other
words, there is nothing to stop corporate control from passing
hand to hand or from its initial consolidation by way of a sweep
of shares in private transactions not on the exchange under cur-
rent law.
published working paper no. 55, Columbia U. School of Law).
6 See infra notes 42, 45 & 51 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 40, 44, 49 & 50 and accompanying text.
8 The sparseness of legal literature dealing with street sweeps is surprising. Even the
limited writings on sweeps are directed primarily at the discussion of the mutual rela-
tions between the sweep and the tender offer. See Thomas J. Andre Jr., Unconventional
Offers Under the Williams Act: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 11 J Cone. L 499
(1986); Lloyd P, Cohen, Why Tender Offers? The Efficient Market Hypothesis, The
Supply of Stock and Signaling, 19 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 113 (1990); D. Roger Glenn, Re-
thinking the Regulation of Open Market and Privately Negotiated Stock Transactions
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 8 J. CoRP. L 41 (1983); Oesterle, supra note
2, at 202.
9 Not all of academia is oblivious to the special questions raised by the street sweep.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corpo-
rate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1693 (1985); see also Edward F. Green & James S.
Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 647 (1985). These two articles, although they do not distinguish between market
sweep and street sweep, pave the way for an understanding of certain aspects of the
problems presented by a sweep. This Article follows that path and proposes a specific
and wider analysis of the street sweep phenomenon.
10 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Article explores whether the absence of statu-
tory regulation of sweeps is harmful. The ans~ver to this question
is yes for a number of reasons. First, the need to protect minor-
ity shareholders in sweeps and the different risks involved in
sweeps makes it clear that a sweep, like the other forms of ac-
quisition regulated by law, poses conditions that are potentially
detrimental to the shareholders. Additionally, a sweep contains
other special features that mandate statutory regulation. Sec-
ond, the non-regulation of sweeps is liable to lead to economi-
cally inefficient deals. In sweeps, unlike all the other means of
acquiring corporate control, the selling shareholders are not
aware of the purchaser's aim to gain control of the corporation.
This state of affairs is likely to lead them into inefficient trans-
actions. Contrary to the position of courts, this Article argues
that sweeps should be viewed as a particularly problematic form
of seizing control and, therefore, should be regulated by law.
Contrary to the position of the SEC, however, sweeps should not
be regulated by tender offer regulations because of the substan-
tive differences between these two forms of acquisition.
Part III proposes new regulations to prohibit the acquisition
of corporate control by means of a sweep. The proposed regula-
tions would forbid an investor who wishes to increase holdings in
a corporation beyond a certain limit (which signifies control of
the corporation) to do so by way of private transactions. Instead,
the investor will be obliged to adopt one of the accepted means
of acquisition regulated by law. This proposal ensures that all
acquisitions of corporate control will be effected in accordance
with the general statutory norms designed to achieve the goals
of economic efficiency and fairness for the shareholders. The
prohibition will reduce the menu of techniques for acquiring cor-
porate control.
Finally, Part IV shows that this reduction is beneficial. The
sweep is an inferior mode of acquisition relative to other modes:
its cost is high and certainty of success questionable. The sweep
is also superfluous because it does not allow the purchaser to
achieve any legitimate goal that could not already be achieved
through existing acquisition methods. The prime motive for pre-
ferring the sweep technique to acquire corporate control is the
[Vol. 58:1195
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purchaser's pursuit of negative advantages," which the current
law attempts to prevent under regulated forms of acquisition of
control. Hence, transactions for transfer of control by means of
sweeps should be prevented.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Problem
The commercial situation discussed in this Article may be
illustrated simply by means of the following hypothetical exam-
ples. Assume that corporations A and B are public corporations
and their shares are traded on the stock exchange. The composi-
tion of ownership of the shares of corporation A is such that
none of the shareholders has more than five percent of the vot-
ing shares. In corporation B, the composition of the shareholders
is different. One person-the "controller"-controls the corpora-
tion with thirty percent of the voting shares, another per-
son-the "contender"-has twenty-five percent of the voting
shares, and the other voting shares are dispersed amongst the
general public of investors.
The contender is interested in acquiring control of both cor-
porations. To do so, he must purchase more than five percent of
the voting shares in each of the two corporations. For the con-
tender's own reasons (which we shall analyze at a later stage), he
prefers neither to resort to the acquisition techniques of merger
and tender offer nor to conduct negotiations for acquiring con-
trol from shareholders. Instead, the contender locates a number
of shareholders, who, for example, each hold three tenths of one
percent of the voting shares in one of the two corporations, and
approaches them directly, conducting private negotiations with
each for the purchase of their shares. The contender is not inter-
ested in disclosing his intention to acquire control of the corpo-
1 Negative advantages of acquisition are those that have their source not in the
creation of new economic assets, but in the transfer of existing economic assets from the
shareholders of the target corporation to the purchaser. For example, the real motive for
acquiring control is sometimes the desire to loot the acquired corporation or to exploit
the mistakes of the market in assessing the value of the acquired company. See Reiner
Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implication of Discounted Share Prices as
an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM L. REv. 891 (1988). Other times the motive is to take
advantage of manipulative accounting. See RONALD J. GimsoN. TjiE LAv., AND FINAN CE OF
CORPORATE AcQuisrrONs ch. 12 (1986).
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rations to any of the shareholders. Therefore, his approach to
each is private and discrete. It is designed to remain hidden
from the other shareholders, management, other potential buy-
ers and, in the case of corporation B, the "controller" as well.
The contender approaches these shareholders in personal meet-
ings, by way of telephone, facsimile, and so on. The price paid
for the shares in each of the transactions is not uniform. Rather,
it is the result of the bargaining skill of each of the selling share-
holders. After closing ten transactions in the shares of each of
the corporations (i.e., he owns three percent of corporation A
and twenty-eight percent of corporation B), he is somewhat con-
cerned about discovery of his secret plan. Therefore he hides his
identity and continues his sweep of the shares through in-
termediaries. After completing an additional ten transactions in
each corporation, the contender achieves his goal: he is the
owner of six percent of the shares in corporation A and thirty-
one percent of the shares in corporation B. He is therefore the
controller of both corporations. In corporation A, he created the
preliminary controlling block, whereas in corporation B, he suc-
ceeded in transferring to himself the control once held by the
controller.
Is the means of acquiring control of the two corporations
adopted by the contender legitimate? Neither transaction for ac-
quiring the shares in either corporation is, in itself, problematic
from a legal point of view. However, does the accumulation of
the transactions and the fact that they form part of a strategic
plan for acquiring control give rise to a normative defect in the
entire process?
B. Current Law
The usual means for acquiring control of a corporation are
mergers, tender offers and the private purchases of control from
its holder. The law does not, however, limit the methods of seiz-
ing control to these three possibilities. The law places neither
prohibitions nor express limitations on acquiring control of a
corporation by any other means. Interestingly, whereas the law
provides detailed and extensive treatment for mergers12 and
11 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 251-53 (1991); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§§ 71-77 (1984) [hereinafter MBCA]. The codes specify the procedure of the transaction,
including the need for each company's board to adopt a merger plan and the need for
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tender offers,13 and struggles with the question of what arrange-
ments, if any, are necessary for dealing with private transactions
for purchases of control,14 there is virtually no specific regulation
on acquisition of control by a sweep.1
Does this mean that sweeps do not require statutory treat-
ment and that there is no legal basis to stop control of a corpo-
ration from being purchased by means of private approaches to
shareholders? The answer is in dispute. Some courts, as well as
the SEC, hold that sweep transactions should be regulated by
approval of the plan by a certain majority of the shareholders. Additionally, the codes
provide the content of the plan and describe the effect of the merger.
13 See The Williams Act, codified at §§ 13(d) (e), 14(d)-(i) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1982).
14 For a survey, see Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions:
Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE NV. REs. L REv. 248 (1985).
15 One of the regulations applicable to sweeps is section 13(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Under that section, a person who, in the process of a sweep of
shares, accumulates five percent or more of the shares of a corporation, must report the
acquisition in a disclosure schedule filed with the SEC within ten days of the date on
which the limit was exceeded. However, this disclosure obligation does not significantly
interfere with completion of the acquisition process by means of a sweep. First, the pur-
chaser has a fair amount of time to conduct a sweep secretly. Second, the disclosure duty
imposed by this section does not apply to a purchaser who owns more than five percent
of the shares of the corporation before he or she starts the sweep process. Third, Item 4
of Schedule 13D requires the purchaser to report his intentions to acquire any additional
shares in the future, or any plan to change the board of directors or management. Never-
theless, in practice many of the disclosures filed under section 13(d) are vague and un-
specific, and therefore do not help the shareholders make a calculated decision with re-
spect to the offer to purchase their shares. Finally, even where section 13(d)'s disclosure
requirements do not serve as a warning sign to the shareholders about the real intention
of the purchaser, it might have a negative effect on the shareholders, which may distort
their decisionmaking process. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
Another piece of legislation relating to sweeps is the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, which provides, in section 18(a), that in cases where the ac-
quisition of shares exceeds certain limits (relating to the acquired corporation and the
extent of purchase) set by law, the purchaser must report the acquisition, before its exe-
cution, to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and, in appropriate cases, must wait a
certain period before completing the transaction. The FTC rules apply these arrange-
ments to creeping acquisitions as well, which characterize many sweeps. See Regulations
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 US.C. § 18(a)
(1989); 16 C.F.R. § 801.13 (1988).
The sweep might also be affected by state law. Many states have legislated state
antitakeover legislation, such as control-share statutes, fair price and business combina-
tion statutes and redemption statutes. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State
Takeover Statutes, 86 MicH L Rxv. 1635 (1988). Even though the goal of such legisla-
tion is, in general, to help the target corporation defend itself against a hostile takeover,
it has clear ramifications on the ability to acquire control of the corporation by means of
a sweep.
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the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act ("Act"). The pur-
pose of the Act is to protect investors from pressures, distortions
and "pirate-like" conduct to which they are exposed during con-
tests for corporate control. Accordingly, the Act contains provi-
sions designed to offset the power of the purchaser and, to the
extent possible, to bring about a balance of power between the
purchaser and the selling shareholders. 16 However, major provi-
sions of the Act do not apply to every case of acquisition of con-
trol, but only to the case in which the acquisition is effected
through a tender offer. Therefore, the application of the arrange-
ments of the Williams Act to sweep transactions depends on the
interpretation of the term "tender offer."
Despite the importance of the term "tender offer," Congress
has consistently refrained from defining it. The absence of a
clear definition may stem from the intention of Congress to ap-
ply the Williams Act to as many transactions as possible, includ-
ing transactions that, at the time of its enactment, were uncom-
mon and unforeseeable. 17 On the one hand, this state of affairs
allows courts and the SEC the flexibility to apply the provisions
of the Act as they see fit in each case. On the other hand, Con-
gress's failure to define "tender offer" also stirs the imagination
of the planners of transactions, who view the absence of a defini-
tion as an opening for crafting takeover techniques that fall
outside the legislative framework of tender offers.18
16 Thus, for example, section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes a
broad duty of disclosure upon the purchaser. This section also provides a time-frame for
the transaction, imposes a duty to pay an equal price for all the shares that are pur-
chased, sets out rules governing the quantity of shares that will be purchased from each
shareholder who wishes to sell his shares, and allows the shareholders who are selling to
withdraw their acceptance of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
" This position is accepted by courts. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp.,
774 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1985). This position is also embraced by commentators. See, e.g.,
EDWARD R. ARONOW ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1
(1977). It is also adopted by the SEC. See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No.
12,676, 10 SEC Dock. 143, 145 (Aug. 2, 1976). Others argue that Congress intended to
leave the task of defining a tender offer to courts and the SEC. See Letter from Senators
Proxmire, Williams and Sarbanes Requesting SEC Views on Tender Offer Laws (July 3,
1979), reprinted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 542, at 3-4 (Special supp. Feb. 27,
1980) [hereinafter Letter].
18 In avoiding the application of the Williams Act, the purchaser benefits greatly by
opening the way for control over the timetable of the execution of the transaction. See
GILSON, supra note 11, at 991. The law deliberately slows down the process of acquisition
to allow the solicited shareholders to collect information concerning the potential pur-
chaser and to assess, in the absence of pressure, the nature of the offer. Similarly, the
[Vol. 58: 1195
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In the convoluted game between the SEC and investors con-
cerning application of the Williams Act, the possible regulation
of share sweeps arises. In many cases purchasers have tried to
purchase control through a sweep, thereby avoiding the applica-
tion of section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
the transaction. 18 The SEC has attempted to broaden the defini-
tion of "tender offer" to include a substantial portion of street
sweep cases. 20 The SEC was apparently aware of the complex
ramifications of the sweep process and the need to protect the
interests of all those involved in the stock market. Therefore, in
the absence of a specific statutory arrangement dealing with
sweeps, the SEC attempted to deal with the sweep issue by ap-
plying an existing legal arrangement to the problem. As a result
the regulation of sweeps under securities law is discussed in the
context of the dispute concerning the proper definition of
"tender offer."
Courts and scholars agree that the term "tender offer"
should not be limited to the narrow dimensions of the classical
tender offer, namely an offer to all shareholders, made through
the media, for the purchase of a certain quantity of shares at a
fixed price within a fixed time .2 Hence, it appears that sweeps
should not be excluded from the Williams Act's coverage merely
postponement allows other elements in the market to evaluate the offer and to consider
whether they want to make the shareholders a more generous offer. The Williams Act
also allows the management of the target corporation to protect itself from the offer of
purchase by adopting various defensive tactics. Accordingly, avoiding the legislative
framework governing a tender offer allows a person acquiring control by way of a sweep
to block objections or informed reactions to the offer, thereby preventing the possibility
of an alternative tender for control of the corporation. Furthermore, the purchaser is not
subject to other requirements imposed upon purchasers by virtue of the Williams Act,
such as the requirement of pretransaction disclosure of extensive information, the re-
quirement to purchase the shares pro rata from all those interested in selling and the
requirement to respond to a right of withdrawal of the sellers. See § 14(d)5-7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(5)-(7) (1970); see also supra note 16.
"See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Herbert A. Einhorn & Terence L Blackburn, The Developing Concept of
"Tender Offer". An Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative Interpretations of the
Term, 23 N.Y. ScHL L. REv. 379 (1978); Neal L Korval, Note, Defining Tender Offers:
Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54 ST. JOHN'S L, Rv. 520, 531-33 (1980); Nathaniel B.
Smith, Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the Williams Act, 53 BRooK. L, Ray. 189
(1987).
" See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Open Market Purchases, 32 Bus Lmwy 1321, 1321 (1977)
("[Tihe Williams Act was not intended to be restricted to conventional tender offers but
rather was meant to encompass all methods of takeovers sought to be achieved by a
large-scale stock purchase program.").
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because they do not mirror the traditional characteristics of
tender offers.
Those discussing this question examined the rationale un-
derlying the enactment of the Williams Act. As was mentioned
above, the purpose of the Act is to protect shareholders from
having to respond hastily to an offer, under pressure and with-
out sufficient knowledge. Therefore, every transaction that
places the shareholders in such a difficult position should re-
quire such protection, irrespective of the technique adopted by
the purchaser.22 This rationale is likely, at times, to demonstrate
the need for applying the Williams Act to a sweep transaction
since the position of shareholders in private transactions can be
at least as inferior as the position of the shareholders faced with
a tender offer.23
The SEC has displayed a preference for examining the sub-
stance of a transaction over its form. Accordingly, the SEC has
referred to the term "tender offer" in the following broad man-
ner: "The term is to be interpreted flexibly and applies to spe-
cial bids ... and any transaction where the conduct of the per-
son seeking control causes pressures to be put on shareholders
similar to those attendant to a conventional tender offer, ' '24
In the well-known case of Cattlemen's Investment Co. v.
Fears25 the district court invoked the rationale test of the Wil-
liams Act to decide whether the Act applied to sweep transac-
22 See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1251 (1982). For dissenting views, compare S-G
Securities Inc. v. Fuqua Investment Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978) (extending
the term "tender offer" to include an event in which the purchaser announces his inten-
tion to acquire controlling shares of the corporation, and subsequently conducts a hur-
ried purchase of shares by means of the open market and private transactions), with
S.E.C. v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the
broad interpretation of S-G Securities). From time to time the SEC has elucidated its
position that under the Williams Act, the scope of the term "tender offer" goes "beyond
the conventional tender offer to include acquisition programs that prevent the type of
abuses that Congress intended to eliminate." SEC Proposed Rules on Acquisitions Dur-
ing and Following a Tender Offer, Exchange Act Release No. 24,976, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1548 (Oct. 7, 1987).
2 In a sweep there is a particular element that exerts pressure on the solicited
shareholder-the purchaser's power of persuasion, which is applied directly to the spe-
cific shareholder. This element is absent in a tender offer and, therefore, the shareholder
is in a preferable position.
24 See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 12,676, 10 SEC DocK. 143, 145
(Aug. 2, 1976).
2 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
. [Vol. 58:1195
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tions. In Fears the shareholder held less than five percent of the
corporation's shares. Over a period of six weeks, the shareholder
purchased a substantial number of shares by means of personal
approaches (through meetings, telephone calls and personal let-
ters) to a large number of shareholders. The Fears court ruled
that this action constituted a tender offer: "The contracts uti-
lized by the defendant seem even more designed than a general
newspaper advertisement, the more conventional type of 'tender
offer', to force a shareholder into making a hurried investment
decision without access to information, in circumvention of the
statutory purpose.""
Other courts have refused to extend the application of the
Act to private transactions, even if they were effected as part of
a general scheme for a massive purchase of shares of the corpo-
ration.27 Support for this view is found in the position of Senator
Williams, the main sponsor of the Act. When the Act was intro-
duced in Congress, the Senator was aware of the similarity be-
tween street sweeps and classic tender offers, particularly in
terms of the public's need for protection. Nevertheless, Senator
Williams explicitly argued against the inclusion of private trans-
actions in the framework of the' Williams Act.
28
1 Id. at 1252. In another well-known case, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court interpreted the term "privately negotiated purchase" ex-
tremely narrowly: every purchase of a significant number of shares vould be considered a
public purchase subject to the strictures of the Williams Act. Id. For an analysis of rele-
vant cases, see Block & Schwarzfeld, Curbing the Unregulated Tender Offer, 6 SEc REo.
L.J. 133 (1978).
27 See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985); S.E.C. v.
Carter Hawley Hale Stores Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtis Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); Energy Ventures Inc. v. Appalachian
Co., 587 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del 1984); University Bank & Trust Co. v. Gladstone, 574 F.
Supp. 1006 (D. Mass 1983); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Rejection of the SEC's position by courts is not the outcome of a judi-
cial analysis on the merits concerning the need for protecting the different parties in-
volved in the sweep transaction. Rather, it results from courts examining the sole ques-
tion of whether tender offer rules apply to street sweeps. In other words, nothing in the
cases indicate a position regarding the actual need to regulate sweeps.
28 See 113 CONG. Rac. 856 (1967). In Senator Williams's opinion, although it is possi-
ble in private transactions to acquire control without disclosing the identity or the inten-
tions of the purchaser, the obligation of disclosure should not be imposed upon a pur-
chaser before the purchase. Senator Williams believed that to subject the sweep to an
obligation of advance disclosure under section 14(d) might be detrimental to the free and
orderly operation of the market in the framework in which the parties to the transaction
do not, as a rule, disclose their interests and the conditions of the private transactions
they conduct.
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Over the years, there have been a number of attempts to
define the term "tender offer." The SEC resorted to objective
numerical parameters to determine with certainty when an ac-
quisition of shares would be subject to section 14(d). The SEC
argued that it is possible to define a tender offer as an approach
made to a certain minimum number of solicitees, within a set
period of time, which results in the transfer to the purchaser of
a certain minimum number of shares.29 This definition would
hold even if the approach to the shareholders was not public, the
price was not uniform, the intention to acquire control was con-
cealed, the price had no premium over market price, the sellers
conducted negotiations over the price and the period of the offer
was open.
Under one of the broadest definitions suggested by the SEC,
a "tender offer" is a solicition that fulfills the following condi-
tion: "It constitutes one or more offers to purchase ... securities
of a single class during any 45 day period, directed to more than
10 persons, and seeking the acquisition of more than five percent
of the class of securities."30 Seemingly, if this broad SEC defini-
tion had been adopted, a large proportion of sweeps would have
fallen within the definition of tender offer and would have been
subject to the requirements of the Williams Act.31
29 See, e.g., Letter, supra note 17; Sec. Ex. Act Reg. § 392 (1968) (only a watered-
down process of swap-up to term transactions in the space of a year- does not constitute
a "tender offer").
11 Proposed Rule 14d-l(b), Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 [1979 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979). In one case, the court relied on the
rule; however, the proposed rule never became binding. E.H.I. of Florida, Inc. v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America, 652 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1981). The proposed rule was opposed
because it blurred the distinction between the application of sections 13(d) and 14(d).
See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS § 2.15 (1984) (criticizing
the proposed rule). The SEC, for its part, did not deny that its broad approach to apply-
ing the Williams Act deviated from the intention of Congress. To justify the deviation,
the SEC relied on the changing times and needs of the securities markets. It argued that
the rationale of the Williams Act applied to transactions, such as sweeps, since they were
not common at the time of enactment of the Williams Act and because these transac-
tions present difficulties the Act was designed to resolve. See GILSON, supra note 11, at
1015-16 (citing Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Proposing Amendments to the Wil.
liams Act).
31 The SEC recommended a legislative solution for the problem of the definition of
the term "tender offer." The SEC proposed adopting the Tender Offer Improvements
Act of 1980, in which the term "statutory offer" would refer to all offers to acquire the
beneficial ownership of equity securities of a public issuer by a person who is the owner
of more than 10 percent of the class. See SECURITIES EXCHANGE CoMbi'N. REPORT ON
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The artificial32 and problematic 3 nature of the SEC-pro-
posed definition has led to its rejection by the majority of courts.
Most courts refuse to extend the Act to a sweep of shares by
means of private transactions, whether effected by a street
sweep or a market sweep. 4 The majority view is that arrange-
ments intended to deal with a particular situation, i.e., tender
offers, should not be extended to different situations, such as
private transactions. Therefore, "[c]urrent law in the United
States takes an atomistic view of formally separate transactions
that cumulatively may shift control, so long as a formal tender
offer is not made to the target's shareholders."33s
H. Tim NEED FOR NEW LEGISLATIVE REGULATION
As explained above, current law deals with street sweeps by
focusing on whether the Williams Act applies to them. This em-
phasis misses a more basic question: what are the important fea-
tures of sweeps and what impact do sweeps have on corporate
investors, on the competitive forces in the securities market and
on the market for corporate control? In the end, existing law
with its two current approaches-non-regulation or regulation
by the Williams Act-is misconceived.
In examining whether legislative regulation of sweeps is
needed, one must first analyze the consequences of an unregu-
lated sweep from two perspectives: corporate fairness and eco-
nomic efficiency.36 To determine the corporate fairness of unreg-
ulated sweeps involves focusing on the ramifications of sweeps
for the welfare of shareholders in the acquired corporation, in-
TENDER OFFER LAWS (1980).
' The substantive provisions of the Williams Act not applicable to sweeps include
those relating to withdrawal, best price rule, proration and the prohibition on purchase
outside of a tender offer.
According to the definition, a private sweep of shares is, contrary to the most
fundamental and characteristic requirements of a tender offer, since the sweep is not
proposed to all the shareholders and it does not offer all the solicitees an identical price.
3 See supra note 27.
See Deborah A. Demott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 117 (1987).
3' An economic analysis of legal rules in the area of corporate law indicates that the
central aim of the rules must be to achieve economic efficiency. This aim is achieved in a
transaction between parties when the rules imposed on the parties lead them to allocate
assets to the user who most values them. It is reasonable to assume that such a user
makes optimum use of the assets, thereby attaining the desired efficiency.
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cluding those who sold their shares in the street sweep and the
minority who did not participate in the transactions and re-
mained involved in the corporation.7 Such shareholder welfare
is derived from preserving: the original nature of the investment;
the fundamental conditions of the contractual agreement; the
commercial environment of the corporation; and basic equality
amongst shareholders in the corporation. Economic efficiency
concentrates on the ramifications of sweeps for the general wel-
fare of the economy. It is derived from the ability to ensure that
the acquisition of the corporation shall be effected by only those
who can maximize the output of the corporation's resources.
Both aspects of sweeps are important. If non-regulation of
sweeps is detrimental to corporate fairness, it can lead to a crisis
of investor confidence in the securities market and to difficulties
in securing capital, including the cost of raising corporate financ-
ing. Similarly, if non-regulation of street sweeps allows for ineffi-
cient transactions, then it will cause an unjustified waste of eco-
nomic resources. These two drawbacks are present in street
sweeps. Without statutory regulation of this technique, market
failure will ensue. This result will be detrimental to the welfare
of both the shareholders in the corporation and the economy as
a whole.
A. Corporate Fairness
1. Consolidation of Initial Control: A Comparison Between
Street Sweeps and Private Acquisitions of Control'
When control is acquired by acquisition of the controlling
block of shares from the previous controller, the substantive po-
sition of shareholders who are not parties to the transaction does
not change; both before the transaction and afterwards, they re-
main minority shareholders in a corporation that is controlled
37 Shareholders shall be termed the "minority" when they do not have the capacity
to dictate their business policy to the corporation (even if they hold more than 50 per-
cent of the voting shares in the corporation) and the "majority" when they have actual
control of the decision-making process (even if they hold less than 50 percent of the
voting shares).
38 While analyzing the considerations of corporate fairness which justify regulation
of street sweeps, we will also indicate the special nature of street sweeps relative to alter-
native means of acquisition. In addition, we shall illustrate general aspects of corporate
fairness that, although not exclusive to street sweeps, nevertheless justify legislative in.
tervention to regulate cases of acquisition of corporate control by this means.
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by others. On the other hand, when control is acquired by means
of a gradual sweep of shares in a series of independent transac-
tions from a community of investors who did not coordinate
their positions when they invested in the corporation, the suc-
cess of the sweep is likely to transform a corporation that is not
controlled to one that is.39 Before the street sweep and in the
absence of cooperation among the various shareholders for the
purpose of imposing their will on the corporation, the corpora-
tion is run by professional managers who are neither connected
to nor appointed by a particular investor. Therefore they have
no incentive, direct or indirect, to prefer the interest of any par-
ticular investor, legally or illegally, to the interests of the corpo-
ration. Under these circumstances, it may be assumed that there
is a climate of equality of rights and of opportunity among all
shareholders in the corporation. After the street sweep, however,
the equality is shattered, since shareholders who did not sell
their shares change from equal shareholders to part of a minor-
ity group that has inferior status in the corporation.
The change in shareholder status in a corporation that is
not controlled before a street sweep has significant economic
consequences. First, the street sweep forces upon the remaining
investors the general and typical incapacity of a minority rela-
tive to the strength of the majority in any democratic regime.
The majority can dictate the corporation's commercial manifesto
as well as its ideological position on social, political and philo-
sophical questions. Before the sweep, every shareholder could
assume that the chances that his opinion would be accepted by
the corporate body were equal to the chances that someone
else's views would be accepted. After the sweep, however, the
purchaser's control over the democratic process ensures that his
opinion prevails in every case; he retains the right to veto and
defeat any proposal that he does not like. As a result, when the
minority shares are offered for sale, a potential buyer knows that
they do not represent any measure of influence over the corpo-
rate policy, and such a buyer, therefore, is not prepared to pay
the price that he would have paid for controlling shares.40
Second, consolidation of control by the street sweep might
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10 See William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the
Sale of Shares, 78 HARV. L. Rv. 505, 526 (1965).
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be misused by the buyer, who could use the corporation's re-
sources for personal gain, thereby reducing the value of the as-
sets of other investors.41 This concern over potential abuse of
control by the controlling party is rooted in daily commercial
practice. The inferiority of the minority is well-documented by
courts as well as by the various proposals to create a system of
behavioral standards for controlling parties and of remedies for
the minority when these norms are breached.42
Third, the rule of the majority in a corporation can deter-
mine not only the nature of investors' rights in the corporation
as a whole, but their identity as well. Corporate law has devel-
oped effective legal techniques that enable the majority to divest
the minority.43 Fourth, the transformation of the corporation to
one that is controlled affects the minority shareholders in that
they lose the potential to trade their securities as an element of
control. Finally, placing control in the hands of a particular en-
tity in some cases immunizes the controller from the possibility
of a hostile takeover of the corporation, which would lead to a
change in the management appointed by the controller. From
the perspective of the minority, this means that market forces
will not be able to protect the minority from the controlling ma-
jority of the company.
This analysis confirms the empirical data, which reveal that
with acquisition of control of the corporation, there is a marked
drop in the value of unsold shares." The data coupled with the
list of economic consequences revive the assumption that the
harm to the minority in the consolidation of initial control of the
corporation is significantly different from the harm to the mi-
nority where, before the transaction, the same investors were in
a minority position. Even though in both cases the minority is a
non-participating third party vis-a-vis the transaction, in a
street sweep (in the course of which the initial control of the
" See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Prob-
lem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. OF ECON. 42 (1980).
" See generally A.H. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L,
REV. 1049 (1931); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
11 A merger allows for a general meeting of shareholders to adopt a resolution that
forces all the shareholders to sell their shares to a third party at a price determined in
negotiations between the corporation and that third party. See supra note 12.
" See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs,
Exchange Act Release No. 21,079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
83,637, (June 21, 1984).
[Vol. 58:1195
STREET SWEEPS
corporation consolidates), the position of the minority suffers in
a more direct and clear fashion than in a private acquisition of
control. Accordingly, the need for legislative intervention to pro-
tect the minority in sweeps in non-controlled corporations is
greater than in the case of private acquisitions of control.
2. Non-Uniformity: A Comparison Between Street Sweeps,
Tender Offers and Mergers
A street sweep is a process that comprises a number of indi-
vidual transactions. The common denominator to these transac-
tions is that their preliminary conditions are equal: what is being
sold is identical, the purchaser is the same (having a set finan-
cial capability and certain motivation for acquisition), and the
transactions generally take place over a fairly short period of
time. This short duration means that between making one deal
and another, the basic financial conditions have not changed in
the corporation, in the sector or in the market in which it oper-
ates. Nevertheless, despite the equal starting conditions, reality
teaches that there is a lack of uniformity in the final conditions
that are agreed upon between the parties to the various transac-
tions made in the framework of a street sweep. The difference
lies in the fact that the process of negotiations, which leads to
the conclusion of each transaction, is secret and private and its
results depend on the balance of personal forces between the
parties involved. Furthermore, the gap between the conditions of
the transactions must be attributed to the fact that the parties
to the various transactions do not, as a rule, have the opportu-
nity to compare notes with respect to the other transactions be-
ing negotiated during a sweep.
On the other hand, the basic principle guiding the legisla-
tive treatment of tender offer and merger is that of equality be-
tween all those involved in the transaction. The desired equality
has several aspects. First, there is the equality of treatment re-
ceived by each of the solicitees, e.g., the consideration received
by all shareholders who sell both in the merger and in the tender
offer is equal and the duration of the offer period is uniform.
Second, there is the equality of the opportunities offered to each
of the solicitees in the tender offer and in the merger. In a
merger, the offer is presented for the approval of the corporation
so that each shareholder retains the right to vote on its accept-
ance. When the corporation has decided to approve the merger,
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
all the shares are acquired. A tender offer also is directed to all
shareholders. Accordingly, if the supply of shares is greater than
demand, the shares will be acquired on a pro rata basis from all
the shareholders who responded to the offer. Finally, there is
equality of information. The person proposing a merger or mak-
ing a tender offer bears a heavy disclosure obligation and must
make the information available to all the shareholders in the
target company.
Consequently, the position of shareholders who are sub-
jected to a tender offer or to a merger is quite different from
that of shareholders in a corporation where shares are being
swept. In a street sweep, the shareholders are all abandoned to
their fate, with no means of ensuring the existence of any form
of equality present in a tender offer or a merger.45 For example,
a purchaser conducting a street sweep may propose different
prices and different conditions in the various sweep transactions,
which violate the equality of treatment premise. Similarly, the
purchaser is not obliged to approach all the shareholders with an
offer to purchase. Instead, the purchaser may choose at will the
seller with whom to deal, which violates the equality of opportu-
nity assumption. Additionally, the purchaser owes no special
disclosure obligation to any of the solicitees, such as his identity
or his intention to acquire control. Additionally, the purchaser is
not obliged to reveal identical information to all the solicitees,
which results in a double breach of the principle of equality of
information.
It is therefore somewhat odd that the law intervenes in the
regulation of mergers and tender offers but refrains from regu-
lating street sweeps, despite the dangerous potential to breach
corporate fairness.
3. Control Premium Sharing
The commercial reality is that when partial control of a cor-
poration is acquired, the price that the purchaser is prepared to
pay for every share that constitutes part of the controlling block
exceeds the market price of that share when it is not sold as part
of the controlling block. The gap between these two prices is
"' See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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called the control premium.46 In the professional literature, the
question of the identity of the parties entitled to benefit from
the premium-the seller of the controlling shares or all the
shareholders-is hotly debated.47 According to advocates of the
"all shareholders" position, the premium is an asset that belongs
to the corporation (since it is the consideration that is paid for
another asset of the corporation, namely control). Therefore, the
person holding control who sells his shares should not be al-
lowed to retain the premium, and must share it with all the
other investors in the corporation.48
However, since those same investors are not parties to the
contracts of sale of the shares that represent control, they can-
not ensure contractually the receipt of their share of the pre-
mium. Consequently, normative intervention is required to force
upon the contracting parties a norm whereby all investors in the
corporation would receive their proportional share of the pre-
mium49 or one that would afford all shareholders an equal op-
portunity to sell their shares to the purchaser of control on the
same conditions as those under which control has been ac-
quired.50 This argument, which is raised in the legal literature
and in cases concerning private acquisition of control, is also
valid in the context of acquisition of control by means of a street
sweep where a control premium is paid.51
46 See Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HAnW L REV. 986 (1957).
47 For a survey of opinions, see F. Hodge O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate
Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liability, 38 U. Prrr. L REv. 9 (1976); Hamilton, supra
note 14, at 248, 249.
4' The argument can also be formulated in a different manner the purchaser of
control receives, in exchange for buying part of the shares in the corporation, the actual
control of 100 percent of the assets and the resources of the corporation. In consideration
of this benefit, the purchaser is prepared to pay a premium price. Since this benefit is
derived from the use he makes of the property belonging to the whole body of sharehold-
ers of the corporation, the consideration for this benefit ought to accrue to the whole
body of shareholders.
49 See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
" For a classic article on this subject, see Andrews, supra note 39.
51 Even if acquisition of control by means of a sweep was effected without the pay-
ment of a premium (or upon payment of a negligible premium), consolidation of initial
control by the "sweeper" denies the shareholders the commercial opportunity of receiv-
ing a premium that they would have been entitled to if the corporation had been ac-
quired by other means:
[T]he acquisition of a control block by one person may also reduce the passi-
bility that some other purchaser will attempt to assemble a competing control
block ... [I]n fact, if another purchaser had known that the first bidder was
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Furthermore, even those who oppose normative intervention
to establish a rule of equal distribution of the premium in a case
of private acquisition of control would probably support inter-
vention in the case of a street sweep. Easterbrook and Fischel
developed an argument, which has gained widespread support in
the legal-economic literature, by which the rule of equal distri-
bution of the premium would not only fail to protect the minor-
ity, but it would adversely affect it. 52 In their view, a rule of
equal distribution of the premium would raise the cost of acquir-
ing control for the purchaser. Therefore, the increased price
might prevent the conclusion of the transaction, even in cases
where the purchaser intends to utilize the resources of the cor-
poration more efficiently. As a result, the minority shareholders
would be denied a commercial opportunity that transfer of con-
trol in the corporation ought to bring them. 3 Easterbrook and
Fischel base their analysis on the economic efficiency of the
transaction. They argue that the interests of the minority are
best secured when the market forces operate free from legisla-
tive intervention. Yet, as explained below, in the particular case
of a street sweep an analysis of the efficiency of the transaction
leads to the conclusion that legislative intervention is necessary
to prevent non-optimal transactions.
4. Dramatic Change in the Corporation
Corporate fairness is liable to be prejudiced not only when a
seeking control in the market, he might have made a tender offer at a hefty
premium, which all shareholders would have had an equal opportunity to
share. The open market purchaser who obtains control deprives all sharehold-
ers of this opportunity.
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 9, at 660-61.
11 On laying the foundations for this argument, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
11 This argument is not convincing; we believe that the mere possibility of benefits
to the minority shareholders, without the realization of those benefits, does not justify
the lack of intervention. It is not enough that purchases of control, on average, increase
the functional efficiency of the acquired corporations. It must also be shown that the
minority shareholders benefit from the improved efficiency. A condition for the benefits
of transfer of control trickling down to the minority is the voluntary agreement of the
new controlling person to share the new benefits created by his acquisition of control of
the corporation with the minority or the ability of the minority to compel the controller
to share these benefits with them. Reliance upon voluntary agreements, however, is not
rational. Moreover, reliance upon the means of compulsion of the minority does not hold
great promise.
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street sweep consolidates initial control of an uncontrolled cor-
poration, 4 but also when the objective of a sweep is to transfer
control from one person to another. Transfer of corporate con-
trol may sometimes bring about a decisive change in the func-
tioning of the corporation and it may have significant conse-
quences for the future of the investments of its shareholders.
Thus, for example, the purchaser of control may turn out to
have less business experience than that of the seller or his skills
or connections may be inferior, thereby harming the clear inter-
est of other investors in the corporation. This scenario is bound
to occur since the seller, who is able to check the identity of the
purchaser of control, has no incentive to prefer a "suitable" pur-
chaser who will bring in a profit for the corporation20 In con-
trast, the minority, who has a clear incentive to select the best
purchaser, is not a party to the transaction and cannot, there-
fore, select the purchaser of control in a private transaction.
Moreover, the change that will be detrimental to the minor-
ity is not necessarily due to selection of an unqualified pur-
chaser. Harm may also stem from a competent purchaser who
has a different sensitivity to risk or a different commercial policy
and investment plan from those of the seller of control. For ex-
ample, a careful investor who purchases shares in a corporation
under the control of a conservative financial institution is liable
to find himself, after transfer of control, involved against his will
in a corporation controlled by an aggressive and possibly even
speculative body. The change in identity of the owner of corpo-
rate control is likely to bring about a change in wide areas of the
corporate experience, including its spheres of operation, its busi-
ness policy, the risks it takes as well as its policy of distributing
dividends and issuing new securities.
Arguably, the shareholders are protected from some of these
changes since corporate law outlines procedures for democratic
decisionmaking in a corporation."' In practice, however, since
' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
" Since the seller extricates himself from his investment in the corporation, his pri-
vate interest does not correlate to the general interest of the corporation and its other
shareholders.
"6 See, e.g., MoDEL BusINsS CoRP. AcT § 10.03(e) (1984) (The procedure to amend
Articles of Incorporation calls for the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares.); id. § 8.08(c) (removal of directors by vote of the holders of a majority of the
shares).
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the purchaser's control of the corporation also assures him con-
trol over the results of the democratic process, it becomes clear
that the democratic process cannot insure the rights of minority
shareholders against these potential dramatic changes . 7 Simi-
larly, minority shareholders are not able to protect themselves
against such changes by selling their shares on the open market,
since the price they will receive for their shares after the change
will reflect the lower value of the corporation as assessed by the
market after the transfer of control. Without legal intervention,
transfer of ownership may sometimes have an instantaneous ad-
verse effect on the sale value of the corporate shares, thereby
blocking the investor's avenue of escape from the consequences
of the transfer of control. Thus, the dramatic change in the cor-
poration resulting from the transfer of control by way of a sweep
justifies the intervention of the law to protect shareholders who
were not partners to the transactions. Accordingly, the transfer
of control is akin to the creation of a new corporation, and the
investors, therefore, should not be forced to remain in it.
B. Economic Efficiency
A transaction for the purchase of shares, which represents
control of the corporation, is different from a transaction for the
purchase of shares, which does not represent control. The latter
involves only the transfer of one asset to the purchaser, i.e., cor-
porate shares, while in the former transaction, two assets are
transferred: shares and control. As such, the objective of eco-
nomic efficiency-to bring about the maximal utilization of as-
sets by ensuring that they are transferred to a body that will
maximize output 58-requires that the transaction for transfer of
control by a street sweep be examined through a double prism:
the market for corporate control and the share market.
See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 88-94 (1970). The de-
pendency of shareholders on the management appointed by the purchaser is almost to-
tal. Shareholders generally have no conduit to the actual commercial situation of the
corporation and its economic environment other than the management. The shareholder
meeting adopts resolutions on the basis of information that the management collects and
selects for it and on the basis of professional assessments of the management. The inves-
tors dwell permanently in the Platonic cave and reality is revealed to them by means of
shadows that the management chooses to present to them. See id. at 84-87.
58 See supra note 36.
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1. Efficiency in the Market for Corporate Control
Advocates of an economic analysis of legal rules argue that,
in general, there should be minimal legislative intervention in
private ,transactions between consenting parties."" Each of the
parties is presumed to act to realize optimal interests in the as-
sets constituting the object of the negotiations. Therefore, even
without regulation, the parties will ensure that the asset will
eventually be transferred to the optimal user. The question,
then, is whether this logic also applies to transactions aimed at
the acquisition of control by way of a sweep or does a sweep
constitute an exception that requires legislative intervention? Is
the policy goal, which requires that control be transferred to the
user who will obtain the greatest output from it, achieved in a
street sweep by exposing the transactions to the alignment of
market forces? Or should there be concern that an unregulated
street sweep is liable to prevent the achievement of such an ob-
jective as a result of some market failure and, therefore, the
transactions ought to be governed by law?
In transactions for the acquisition of corporate control by
means of acquisition other than a street sweep, the parties in-
volved are aware that the purpose of the transaction is the
transfer of control. In a merger, a tender offer and in the private
acquisition of control, the seller of control (the corporation, the
shareholders or a particular shareholder) knows that the objec-
tive of the transaction is not limited to the trade in corporate
shares, but is also directed at bringing about the transfer of an
additional asset-corporate control. Consequently, with respect
to each of these methods, the negotiations conducted between
the parties express their assessment of the value of control..
Therefore, it may be assumed that market forces will ultimately
cause control to be transferred to the most efficient user.10 In a
11 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & D~AmL R FisciF.L. T m EcoNomic STRucmatz
OF CORPORATE LAW ch. 1 (1991).
"o For example, in the case of private acquisition of control, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the reason the seller and purchaser agreed to the conditions of the transaction
lies in the fact that the purchaser places greater value on control than does the seller.
This state of affairs constitutes a good indication that the purchaser is the most produc-
tive user of the assets and that the transaction is "efficient." As such, there are those
who hold that from considerations of economic efficiency, there should be no interference
in the transaction and that the interests of the minority-which in their view are linked
to the interests of the controlling factor-will not be harmed by transfer of control to a
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street sweep, however, the situation is completely different. The
sweep conceals from sellers vital information concerning the
transaction, thereby stifling the competition that is necessary to
ensure economic efficiency.
A street sweep comprises a number of independent individ-
ual transactions. On the surface, the negotiations, which are con-
ducted between the purchaser and each of the shareholders, are
independent for the purpose of selling a limited number of
shares that do not amount to a transfer of control to the pur-
chaser. The purchaser does not make any public or private dec-
laration concerning the overall plan of acquisition. The investors
who are being solicited and who have not coordinated positions
are not usually aware of the existence of any such plan. More-
over, acquisition of corporate control by way of a street sweep is
liable to conceal the buyer's real objective not only from the
shareholders who are being solicited, but also from all others
who are involved in the market for corporate control. The sellers
and the market forces will believe that the purchaser in the
sweep bought one asset (shares) and will not be aware that the
success of the sweep delivers an additional asset-control. As a
result of the general lack of awareness of the true economic sig-
nificance of sweep transactions, negotiations related to these
transactions may not reflect the parties' true assessment of the
value of the assets involved. The purchaser who offers the share-
holders a price that is acceptable to them creates a prima facie
assumption that the purchaser is a more efficient user of the
shares. 61 However, this does not indicate whether he is also the
most efficient user of control. Forces in the control-market will
not engender competitors who will offer a better price for the
shares. Since the market does not reflect that control is up for
sale, the competition that is vital to ensure economic efficiency is
not created.
Therefore, legislative intervention is necessary to establish
standards that deny the parties to sweep transactions autonomy
in determining the conditions of these transactions. Sweeps
should be subject to regulations designed to assure the achieve-
ment of the efficiency objectives.
preferred user who will be chosen by the market forces. See Fischel & Easterbrook,
supra note 58.
"1 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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2. Efficiency in the Market for Corporate Shares
Avoiding the consequences of the above economic analysis
involves creating minimalist normative rules that will not affect
the conditions of a street sweep transaction itself, but will im-
pose a duty to disclose an intention to take control by means of
a street sweep. Indeed, such rules exist in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. They obligate a purchaser of shares that
raises his holdings in the corporation-by whatever technique,
including a street sweep-to more than five percent, to report
this to the issuing corporation, to the exchange on which the
shares are traded and to the SEC within a period of ten days
from the purchase of the shares that raised his holdings above
the five percent limit.6 2 The disclosure is designed to serve as a
warning sign to the other shareholders and traders of the pur-
chaser's motivation to secure a jumping-off point for acquiring
control of the corporation. Is this modest requirement of report-
ing sufficient to ensure achievement of the objectives of eco-
nomic efficiency in the case of a sweep of shares or is more sub-
stantive intervention of the law required in regulating the
transaction?
An analysis of the practice of street sweeps reveals that they
are likely to fail to engender efficient results not only when the
purchaser conceals his intention to acquire control, but also
when the shareholders who are being solicited and the market as
a whole are aware of the purchaser's intention to takeover. Fur-
thermore, discovery of such an intention not only fails to pre-
vent the potential economic harm to the minority, but it is likely
to increase it, thereby increasing the need for normative inter-
vention in the transaction. The reporting of the intention to ac-
quire control, on the one hand, clarifies the situation in the mar-
ket for control and helps to create an open competition for
control of the corporation. On the other hand, such reporting
may distort the forces operating in the market for the corporate
shares and bring about an allocation of shares to users who do
not obtain optimal output.6 3
2 Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1981 &
Supp. 1992).
'3 The most productive user of a share is the user who is able to make optimum use
of the array of rights linked to the share. Thus, goals of economic policy will be achieved
if the voting right that the share grants to its holder-a right that delivers the capacity
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In the case of the disclosure of takeover intentions in a
street sweep, pressure is exerted on the shareholders. This may
cause them to make a distorted choice and to agree to the pro-
posed street sweep transaction, even though they do not think
that its conditions are worthwhile. To elucidate the psycho-com-
mercial dynamic that may bring about the said market failure,
one can envision a set of considerations of the solicitee, who be-
lieves that the stock he is holding is more valuable than the
price he has been offered by the purchaser. The solicitee may
worry that despite his objection to the conditions of the transac-
tion, the purchaser will acquire control of the corporation
through other transactions, thereby making his shares inferior
minority shares. Consequently, the shareholder might respond
positively to an offer, even though it is not worthwhile. This pro-
cess is liable to repeat itself with other shareholders and become
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Theoretically, it is possible that none
of the shareholders who are being solicited will assess that the
conditions of the street sweep transaction are worthwhile for
him and, nevertheless, the shares will be sold to the "sweeper."
As such, the execution of street sweep transactions without regu-
lation by an intervening, mandatory legal norm will lead to a
transfer of shares and of control of the corporation to a pur-
chaser who is not necessarily its best user, thereby frustrating
the policy objective of economic efficiency. 4
to influence the decision-making process in the corporation-is transferred to a user who
knows how to make the best use of it.
0' Concern about a distorted choice on the part of shareholders when they are aware
of the intention of takeover is not exclusive to a sweep; it exists in similar fashion to a
tender offer. Therefore market failure, which results from the pressure to which the
shareholders are subjected, justifies the intervention of the legislator to rescue the share-
holders from their straits in the two situations. See Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1693. In a
tender offer, the pressure exerted on the shareholder who is selling is indirect and stems
from his assessment of the commercial reality of the corporation. A street sweep, how-
ever, involves the added element of direct pressure stemming from the direct and per-
sonal dealings between the purchaser and the shareholder:
The fundamental problem with direct solicitation is the communication that
normally accompanies face-to-face offers. An acquirer usually, if not always,
tells each solicitee that it intends to stop purchasing once it acquires a set
amount of target stock, and urges the solicitee to tender in order to participate
in the acquisition and collect any part of the acquisition premium.
Oesterle, supra note 2, at 225. The additional force of personal pressure exerted on the
shareholder in a sweep increases the potential for distortion of the decision he will make
in relation to the offer to purchase.
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C. Structural Considerations Deriving from an Overall View
of Corporate Control Transactions
Another angle from which to examine whether street sweeps
should be regulated is to compare street sweeps and the current
arrangements pertaining to alternative modes of acquisition:
merger, tender offer and private acquisition of control. Current
law does not allow an entity that is interested in acquiring con-
trol in a corporation by means of one of these three techniques
to do so without being overseen. Rather, the law intervenes in
the execution of the transaction in each of these techniques
through a detailed set of normative, binding rules.0 The failure
to regulate street sweeps by legislation will affect the application
of the legislation that deals with these other means of acquisi-
tion, since the law's oblivion to the street sweep provides pur-
chasers with an opening to evade the legislative requirements for
attempting a merger, tender offer or private acquisition of
control.
A purchaser will prefer conducting a street sweep rather
than resorting to the other modes when he determines that he
cannot obtain the desired commercial results other than by way
of a sweep. A legal system that does not regulate street sweeps
may allow a purchaser to take control of a corporation even in a
situation where the transaction constitutes a violation of both
corporate fairness and economic efficiency."0 A significant por-
tion of existing laws regulating mergers, tender offers and pri-
vate acquisitions of control attempt to prevent acquisitions that
are tainted by unfairness and inefficiency. Therefore, non-regu-
lation of street sweeps allows for the execution of transactions
that the law was designed to prevent: inefficient and unfair
deals.
1. Considerations of Corporate Fairness
The central features of the legislation regulating the sub-
stantive and procedural conditions of mergers,67 tender offers, 8
"' For an illustration of some of the arrangements, see infra notes 68-77.
60 See supra notes 39-42 & 57-59 and accompanying text.
'7 The substantive and procedural conditions of merger are typical of corporation
law in various states. For the references for two of these Acts, see supra note 12.
68 See The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f (1982); supra note 13.
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and private acquisitions of control are considerations of corpo-
rate fairness.
a. Substantive Conditions
The statutory norms that regulate tender offers and mergers
ensure equality of treatment, opportunity and information
among all the shareholders in the target corporation. Unlike
the general approach of modern commercial law, which tends
not to intervene in contracts reached by parties of their own free
will, tender offer law tends to regulate various substantive de-
tails of transactions of acquisition, such as determining the level
of consideration,70 the number of shares to be acquired from
each shareholder,7' the duration of the offer, 2 the information
that is to be disclosed 73 and the right of the parties to with-
draw.74 Unlike tender offers, in mergers the target (and not its
shareholders) is the party to the contract. The basic principle is
that the conditions of the transaction to which the corporation
agreed apply equally to all shareholders. In the two
cases-merger and tender offer-the law dictates a rule for the
sharing of the control premium among shareholders. 7 The justi-
fication for the paternalism adopted by Congress regarding the
status of the parties in transactions of merger and tender offer is
the desire to protect the community of shareholders and to es-
tablish a regime of corporate fairness by preserving unity in the
attitude of the purchaser toward the shareholders and by pre-
serving the balance of power between the shareholders
themselves.
In private acquisitions of control, scholars and courts are di-
6'9 See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
70 See § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
71 See Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1991).
72 See Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1991).
73 See Rule 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1991).
" See Rule 14d-7(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1991).
71 In a merger the target corporation ceases to exist. M.B.C.A. § 11.06 (1984). There-
fore the premium is distributed among all the shareholders of the target corporation
(equality of treatment). A tender offer is an offer aimed to purchase a certain amount of
the target's shares. The offer is public and not directed to specific shareholders. This
character of the tender offer assures that the premium is offered to all the shareholders
(equality of opportunity). Section 14(d)(7) provides that all the sellers will receive the
same price for their shares, even if some of them are tendered before an increase occurs
in the offering price.
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vided on the need for normative intervention. Some hold that
the law must intervene to ensure sharing of the premium re-
ceived by the seller among all the shareholders (equality of
treatment). Others favor forcing the purchasing shareholder to
make the offer made to the controlling shareholders to all other
shareholders (equality of opportunity). Finally, some commenta-
tors contend that the law should not intervene in the question of
the distribution of the premium at all.7 Yet even those who
deny the need for legislative intervention to assure equality
agree that the law must provide special behavioral norms re-
garding a transaction in which control is sold. The case law has
developed a whole system of special behavioral norms that bind
the controlling shareholder who is interested in selling his con-
trolling block. For example, the seller must refrain from selling
control to a person who is liable to cause damage to the corpora-
tion. Additionally, he must refrain from effecting a transaction
in a manner that would arouse concern that the consideration he
received from the transaction is not only consideration for the
shares sold, but also for his post as corporate officer. Similarly,
he must ensure that he does not sell the business opportunities
that belong to the corporation or to the whole community of
shareholders. 7" These behavioral norms, which are all subsumed
under the general heading of the fiduciary duties of the control-
ling shareholders, were designed to prevent a situation in which
transfer of control is effected at the expense of the shareholding
public, which is not a partner to the transaction, thereby consti-
tuting a violation of corporate fairness. The law chose to protect
the community of shareholders by imposing behavioral norms
not only on a person who has gained control, but also on the
person selling control, even though the seller may have no inter-
est in or intention of harming the shareholders.7
A person who seeks to purchase controlling shares for unac-
ceptable purposes, such as embezzlement, might sometimes
come up against the refusal of the controlling block to cooperate
76 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
77 For a discussion of these rules and related cases, see RoDERT C CLnUv,, Coiu'o-
RATE LAW § 11.4 (1986).
78 Existing cases provide that the sale of control to a looter is a breach of fiduciary
duty of the holder of control, even if the seller did not know of the purchaser's intention
to loot, but ought to have known or deliberately ignored this possibility. See, e.g., De
Baun v. First Western Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. App. Ct. 1975).
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in light of the threat of the above legislative arrangements. In a
system that permits street sweeps, a person interested in acqui-
sition for illegitimate purposes will attempt to circumvent this
whole array of norms by acquiring control by means of a street
sweep. By this technique, control is acquired from the general
public of investors, none of whom holds control of the corpora-
tion individually and the sellers are not, therefore, subject to the
said behavioral obligations of the controlling shareholders. Simi-
larly, in a street sweep, the sellers are sometimes unaware that
the purchaser might be purchasing their shares as part of a take-
over plan and they are not, therefore, subject to the said norms
of conduct.
b. Procedural Conditions
In corporate mergers, the law stipulates that the transaction
must be approved by a certain majority of the shareholders in a
general meeting of the corporation as a condition of its execu-
tion. 9 In a tender offer, there has been a proposal to stipulate
by law that a precondition of a transaction is the support of the
majority of shareholders of the corporation, even though a
tender offer is directed at the shareholders and not at the corpo-
ration.80 Underlying such rules of play is the desire to prevent
various types of detriment to corporate fairness. For example,
the problems that arise following consolidation of initial control
of the corporation and reduction of the shareholders to minority
status are solved, at least partially, when the law avails the
shareholders with the option* of rejecting the proposal for consol-
idation of initial control. The affirmative vote of the sharehold-
ers supporting consolidation of the initial control means that the
majority of shareholders in the corporation believe that the ad-
vantages they will gain from new management will outweigh the
devaluation of their investment as a result of their minority
status.
Therefore, corporate fairness is an important rationale un-
derlying the statutory norms regulating the acquisition of con-
trol by means of a tender offer, merger and private acquisition of
the controlling block.
See, e.g., MBCA § 11.01 (1984).
80 See Bebchuk, supra note 9.
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2. Considerations of Economic Efficiency
a. Efficiency in the Sale of Corporate Control
In a merger and a tender offer, it is clear that the object of
the acquisition is to gain control of the corporation. The law is-
sues a caution about the offer of the corporation for sale and the
price tag attached to it by subjecting the transaction to the ap-
proval of the meeting of shareholders (merger)"1 or by publiciz-
ing it to the public at large (tender offer). The requirement that
the general meeting approve the transaction allows each of the
shareholders to consider the conditions not as an offer to
purchase the shares in his possession, but as an offer to purchase
control (which he does not have). The requirement to publicize
the offer means that if the purchaser does not maximize output,
market forces will produce a better offer than that of the pur-
chaser, there will be a tender for control and, at the end of the
process, control will pass into the hands of the most efficient
user.
b. Efficiency in the Sale of Shares
The proposal to stipulate by law that the condition for legi-
timization of the tender offer is approval by the majority of
shareholders solicited is designed to solve the problem of the
distortion of choice of these shareholders. 2 However, since the
same system of pressure exists in the context of a street sweep,83
non-regulation of a sweep by statute allows the purchaser to im-
pose upon the shareholders the distorted choice while avoiding
the regulations governing tender offers.
Therefore, the statutory arrangements concerning the vari-
ous modes of acquisition ultimately aims to prevent breaches of
corporate fairness and to ensure the promotion of economic effi-
ciency in transactions for acquisitions of control. Non-regulation
of street sweeps will leave a serious lacuna in this system of reg-
ulation, threatening the very effectiveness in preventing viola-
tions in fairness and efficiency of transactions for acquisition of
control in corporations through other methods. Accordingly, a
"' Section 11.01 of the MECA provides that a plan of merger should be approved by
each of the corporations taking part in the transaction in a shareholders' meeting.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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structural view of the whole range of techniques for acquisition
of control mandates legal intervention to prevent problematic
sweep transactions and, in turn, to eliminate the possibility of
unfair or inefficient transfers of corporate control.
III. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REGULATION
The simplest, albeit most rigid, form of intervention in
sweep transactions is to impose a complete ban on such transac-
tions in cases where a sweep will lead to a transfer of control to
the purchaser. Even though in principle Congress should try to
refrain from intervening in transactions between consenting par-
ties, the concern for preventing a breach of corporate fairness
and ensuring economic efficiency justifies imposing such a strict
prohibition on sweeps.
A. The Substance
Different rules are required for sweeps in different factual
situations. To distinguish between a permitted sweep and a pro-
hibited sweep one must ascertain the number of shares held by
the purchaser before and after the sweep.
First, the law will stipulate a rebuttable legal presumption,
whereby possession of a certain proportion of the shares of the
corporation gives the holder "control" of the corporation. Sec-
ond, where both before and after the sweep the purchaser does
not hold the proportion of shares set by the law as constituting
control of the corporation, the law will not intervene in the
sweep and will not place constraints upon the purchasing pro-
cess. Third, where before the sweep the purchaser did not have
control, but has acquired control by means of the sweep, the law
will intervene and ban the sweep. The purpose of the prohibi-
tion is to limit the menu of techniques by which control may be
acquired and to force the parties to use one of the regulated
techniques established in the law-merger, tender offer or pri-
vate acquisition of control. Finally, when before the sweep the
purchaser held control of the corporation and the purpose of the
sweep is to fortify his position, the law will allow the transac-
tion, since it does not give rise to serious concerns about under-
mining corporate fairness or economic efficiency.
The following example illustrates the features of the pro-
posed regulation. Assume that corporate "control" is defined by
[Vol. 58: 1195
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law as ownership of twenty-five percent of the voting rights in
the corporation. The holder of ten percent of the voting rights
who is interested in acquiring another ten percent of the shares
can do so by way of sweep, without any legislative intervention.
However, if the shareholder wishes to purchase another twenty
percent of the shares, he will not be able to approach the other
shareholders privately, off the exchange, in an attempt to con-
duct private transactions by way of a sweep, since this would
lead to the transfer of control into his hands by a prohibited
method. Under the proposed regulation, the transfer of control
could be effected only if the purchaser employs one of the tech-
niques recognized and regulated by law. Recourse to each of
these techniques will clarify to the parties of the transaction
that the purpose of the transaction is not just a regular purchase
of corporate shares, but transfer of control of the whole corpora-
tion. Removing the veil to expose the purpose and true nature of
the transaction will ensure that corporate fairness is preserved
and that the control is transferred to the optimal purchaser.
What happens when a person violates the prohibition and
purchases controlling shares by way of a sweep? The proposed
regulation does not advocate intervention in the freedom of the
parties to transact in a sweep, even if it was accomplished in a
prohibited manner; it therefore recognizes the validity of the
transaction to transfer the property right in the shares on the
level of relations between the seller and the purchaser. Instead,
it is proposed that a purchaser who conducted a prohibited
sweep will not be permitted to benefit from the fruit of his for-
bidden act. Therefore, even though the law recognizes his owner-
ship of the purchased shares, it will not permit him to invoke
the voting rights that these shares provided him.84 Moreover, ac-
quisition of control by way of a sweep will also lead to the expi-
ration of other voting rights of the purchaser derived from the
64 Cases have recognized the possibility of revoking voting rights acquired by illegal
means. Thus, for example, in a case in which a share purchaser did not fulfill the disclos-
ure obligation of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, the court examined the damage
caused to the corporation, its employees and shareholders by non-disclosure and decided
that it could not be restored. The court held that the most appropriate remedy in the
circumstances was a declaration that the shares acquired by illegal means were "tainted"
shares, carrying no voting rights. Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp., 661
F. Supp. 825, 851 (N.D. IMI. 1987).
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shares he held on the eve of the sweep. 5 The purchaser will be
able to resume invoking his voting rights with the shares that he
held on the eve of the sweep if he makes amends by selling the
shares that he acquired in the prohibited sweep to another per-
son. He will then regain his former status of a person who does
not have control over the corporation.
B. The Mode of Operation
The objective of the proposed regulation is to ensure that
acquisition of control will be effected only in situations in which
corporate fairness toward both the shareholders who are selling
and the shareholders who refrained from selling is maintained,
and only when the purchaser is the most efficient user of control.
These goals will be achieved by various means.
1. Deterrence
A purchaser who is interested in circumventing the legisla-
tive regulation of the techniques of control designed to ensure
corporate fairness and efficiency will be deterred from doing so
by means of a sweep for fear of losing his voting rights. Even the
ability to sell the shares he collected, should he be caught, will
not lessen his reluctance to resort to the prohibited practice,
since it is reasonable to expect that the price he will receive for
the sale will be less than that he paid for the purchase.8 8
85 Taking away a voting right held by a person on the eve of the sweep is not a
punitive result. Rather, its aim is to ensure that the sinner not be rewarded. The fear is
that if the voting rights were not revoked, the purchaser is likely to become the control-
ling factor in the corporation, even without resorting to the quantity of shares acquired
through the sweep. This is a result of the growth of the purchaser's relative share of the
voting rights and the corresponding decrease in the total quantity of voting shares in the
corporation. o
88 The acquisition is effected in a continuous process over time according to the laws
of supply and demand. The continuous nature of the sweep is liable to bring about an
increased demand and a rise in the price of the shares. The purchaser is prepared to pay
the high price since his intention is to acquire another asset-control of the corpora-
tion-and the rise in value of the shares in the process of a sweep is justified, from his
point of view, as the payment of a premium for this asset. On the other hand, the sale is
effected due to the purchaser being forced, by the legal arrangement, to sell his shares.
The intervention of the law creates an artificial supply of shares that is not consequent
upon the market's assessment of the shares. As a result, it may be assumed that the price
of the shares will fall. Furthermore, the purchasers do not expect to gain control of the
corporation and the price that they are prepared to pay will most likely reflect this.
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2. Economic Efficiency
Even where the deterrence inherent in the proposed regula-
tion is not effective and the purchaser risks acquiring control by
means of a sweep, the proposed regulation will attain the objec-
tive of economic efficiency since the regulation will force the
purchaser to resell a part of his holdings and to forego his posi-
tion as the controlling factor in the corporation. Thus, transfer
of control to a person who does not maximize output will be ne-
gated and future transfer of control will be effected in an open
manner by means of one of the set legal techniques, with disclos-
ure of the conditions of the transaction and all relevant informa-
tion for the market forces. Moreover, the regulation will also
achieve economic efficiency regarding sale of the corporate
shares. The source of the reduction in efficiency of the share
market lies in the pressure applied to investors to sell their
shares when they realize that the objective of the sweep is acqui-
sition of control. However, under the proposed regulation, the
shareholders' knowledge of the sweep's objective will enable
them to prevent it. The proposed regulation, which forbids ac-
quisition of control by a sweep, assures the shareholders that the
sweep will not be effective in pushing them into a minority posi-
tion. The goal of economic efficiency will be attained because the
shareholders will be able to consider the offer in an undistorted
manner.
3. Corporate Fairness
Examining the regulation through the prism of corporate
fairness requires a separate discussion of the shareholders who
sold their shares in the sweep and those who did not respond to
the offer. The latter's concern about consolidation of initial con-
trol of the corporation and their resulting relegation to the mi-
nority will be dissipated with the implementation of the regula-
tion. It will ensure that the former structure of ownership of the
corporation's capital will be restored and that their status in the
corporation will not change as a result of the prohibited sweep.
On the other hand, the regulation will not serve as a means for
shareholders who sold their shares to regain their property, since
the proposal honors the legal force of the sweep between the
parties to the transaction. Nevertheless, the regulation will en-
sure fair treatment of sellers as well, since the result of the regu-
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lation-that control not be transferred by means of a
sweep-turns into the reality that sellers perceived, i.e., that the
only asset being sold was the corporate share and not corporate
control. The proposed regulation means that the transactions
conducted by the sellers are not different in nature from other
ordinary transactions for the sale of shares. Therefore there is
no need to protect them and to grant them special advantages
beyond the conditions to which they agreed when making the
transaction.
The need to ensure the various types of equality (of treat-
ment, of opportunity or of information) arises in situations
where various transactions constitute part of a single, compre-
hensive purchase plan, aimed at the control of the corporation.
However, since the proposed arrangement does not allow the ac-
quisition of control by the sweep, it negates the common denom-
inator of all the transactions in the sweep plan. Thus, it is not
unfair if the terms of the various transactions are not equal.
C. Flexibility in the Proposed Regulation
1. The Exceptional Case
The proposed regulation suggests that the law will stipulate
a presumption that the acquisition of shares, which transfers
into the possession of the purchaser a quantity of shares exceed-
ing a certain level, say twenty-five percent, will constitute con-
trol. What will happen in cases where it is clearly proved that, as
a result of the structure of ownership of the corporate capital,
the level set is not the appropriate determinant of ownership of
control? For example, what justification is there for prohibiting
a sweep in the case of a corporation in which a sweep of more
than twenty-five percent of the voting rights is in progress, but
in which there is a single shareholder (or one group of share-
holders acting in concert) who holds more than fifty percent of
the voting rights and who declares that it is not his intention to
sell his shares to the person sweeping shares and who refuses to
cooperate with him in the future? Furthermore, in the opposite
case, what justification is there for allowing a sweep that does
not reach the level set by law in a corporation where shares are
so widely dispersed that control of the corporation can be ac-
quired by purchase of a block of shares that amounts to less
than twenty-five percent of the voting shares?
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The potential gap between the proposed legal presump-
tion-where there is a set level of holdings that grants the own-
ers control-and reality necessitates including in the regulation
a mechanism for addressing the exceptional cases.
One possible solution lies in establishing an administrative
body that is empowered to deal with exceptional sweep cases.
However, the justification for establishing special bodies exists
only where the questions with which they must deal are special-
ized and require professional expertise. Here, this is unneces-
sary. The task of the body deciding the question of applying the
sweep regulations in a given case is not complicated and, there-
fore, does not require professional expertise. All that is required
is an examination of the way in which ownership of the corpo-
rate capital is distributed to determine whether the sweep
changed the identity of the controlling person in the corpora-
tion. The SEC or the courts are able to conduct such an exami-
nation at low cost and with reasonable speed.
Consequently, the proposed regulation should stipulate that
the shareholders of the corporation whose shares are being swept
retain the right to apply to the courts or the SEC to examine
whether the sweep process brought about a transfer of control.
At the same time, a purchaser who plans a sweep exceeding the
permitted limit may apply to the courts or the SEC to deter-
mine whether to allow the sweep; these bodies can grant the ap-
plication if it is established that the sweep does not result in a
transfer of corporate control.
2. Modification of the Terms of the Regulation
The enabling nature of the regulation should be univalent.
A corporation will not be allowed to stipulate in its bylaws or in
any other contract that it is permissible to sweep its shares be-
yond the limit set by law. It will, however, be permitted to make
the standards tougher and to stipulate that acquisition of an
even lower percentage of ownership will trigger the application
of the proposed regulation. Seemingly, corporations will choose
the latter option when they believe that it is possible to transfer
corporate control from one to another by purchasing a small
number of voting shares. Other corporations, which need not be
concerned about transfer of control by means of a sweep of a
lower percentage of shares than that set by law, will have no
need to establish stricter requirements. An unnecessary preven-
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tion of the free transfer of shares, when no transfer of control is
involved, is liable to affect the negotiability of shares by lower-
ing demand for them and reducing their value, without affording
any advantages to the shareholders.8 7
IV. THE COST OF THE LEGISLATIVE REGULATION
To justify such an invasive and comprehensive legislative
regulation, it must be asked whether, as a rule, it is reasonable
to anticipate that the benefits of including the sweep in the list
of permitted control-acquisition techniques will outweigh its
damage. Since the purchaser initiates the transaction and re-
tains the ability to decide which means of acquisition will be em-
ployed, it is necessary to examine the question from the perspec-
tive of the purchaser of control. Therefore, what are the
incentives for the purchaser to prefer a sweep over other forms
of purchase? If the sum total of the array of incentives is likely
to be positive, i.e., acquisition by way of a sweep allows the pur-
chaser to make efficient transactions in a manner that is not
possible through the other modes of acquisition, then prevention
of such transactions should be seen as a hefty cost of the pro-
posed regulation. On the other hand, if the sum total of incen-
tives is negative, i.e., if the preference for the sweep lies in the
desire to obtain an illegitimate advantage that cannot be ob-
tained through the other modes of acquisition, then the law
" Providing an enabling nature to the regulation is liable to create an opening for
abuse by the corporation management: the management will cause the corporation to
adopt a voluntary arrangement, prohibiting a sweep of shares in the corporation beyond
a ceiling that is lower than that set by the regulation, even if it is clear that possession of
the said quantity of shares does not transfer an asset other than the shares themselves to
the purchaser. Such a stipulation will serve the interests of the management, since it will
make it difficult to purchase significant blocks of shares, thereby reducing the chances of
a consolidation of power outside the management. Despite this, there is no reason to
prohibit the said stipulation, since even under existing law, management may determine
various voluntary arrangements that will strengthen its position at the expense of the
interests of the corporation it is supposed to serve. The laws of corporations relate to
them by various means, such as imposition of a fiduciary duty on managers, which is
intended to limit the agency costs resulting from separation of control from ownership of
the corporation. See, e.g., MBCA § 860 (discussing directors' conflict of interest). These
problems give rise to a similar, though not identical, question to that arising in the con-
text of defensive tactics, which the managers are liable to adopt against a potential hos-
tile tender offer. Scholars and courts express different views as to the position that the
law ought to take on this subject, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this
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ought to impose a general prohibition on sweeps.
A. The Sweep: An Inferior Mode of Acquisition
The best interest of the purchaser requires him to prefer
any of the other modes-merger, tender offer or, in appropriate
cases, private acquisition of control-over the street sweep. The
technique of sweep, when examined from the purchaser's point
of view, is unsophisticated. It requires the purchaser to: (1) seek
out each of the shareholders (since the purchase takes place off
the exchange); (2) conduct a long series of separate negotiations
with each of the sellers; and (3) incur costs with respect to each
of the separate transactions (checking the seller's ownership,
drawing up a separate contract, various legal costs, and so on).
A more serious problem from the purchaser's point of view
is that at the time when the purchaser is investing his resources
in the purchase of corporate shares, he cannot be certain about
two of the central parameters of the transaction: the accomplish-
ment of his goal, i.e., the acquisition of control, and its cost. A
comparison with the position of a person who acquired control
by means of a tender offer will illustrate this important point.
From a contractual point of view, a tender offer is a transaction
for the acquisition of control. In other words, the purchaser an-
nounces in advance to all the shareholders that his offer is de-
pendent upon attaining control and that if there is insufficient
response to his offer, the offer will be withdrawn. In a sweep,
however, each transaction is independent and defined as a trans-
action for the acquisition of a certain number of shares held by
the seller. Similarly, the various transactions in a tender offer
take place simultaneously, while sweep transactions take place
over a period of time. Thus, in a tender offer, it is possible to
determine in advance whether or not the objective has been
achieved. Since the offer is made for the purpose of acquiring
control, the person making the offer can withdraw it if he finds
that the objective has not been achieved. Moreover, since the
offer is uniform regarding all the shareholders, it is clear to the
purchaser in advance what the cost of control will be, should the
transaction work out. In a sweep of shares, the purchaser cannot
make the validity of each individual transaction conditional
upon the execution of future transactions with other sharehold-
ers. In other words, the purchaser is liable to discover, after in-
vesting his money in purchasing a certain amount of shares, that
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he cannot gain control through the sweep and that he cannot
back out of the concluded transactions. Moreover, because the
transactions are disparate and consecutive, the purchaser cannot
know in advance what the overall cost will be of attaining
control.
Why, then, should a person interested in control choose to
forego the convenient and efficient option of a tender offer and
prefer to take the bumpy road of a sweep? The true advantage
of resorting to a sweep, from the purchaser's point of view, lies
in his desire to escape the net of the legislative arrangements
that restrict the other forms of acquisition. A purchaser will
choose a sweep, despite the drawbacks, because he hopes that by
the extra concern of maintaining the sweep, he will succeed in
taking over the corporation without corporate fairness vis-a-vis
all the shareholders in the corporation. Similarly, he gains con-
trol, despite the fact that he might not be the most efficient
user.
If the buyer were to invoke other modes of acquisition, the
legislative rules would force him to act fairly and efficiently and
to compete on the share and control markets. Additionally, the
regulations would insulate the shareholders from the pressure
that the purchaser intends to place upon them through the
sweep. Therefore the purchaser does not resort to these
techniques.
Considering that the cost of the sweep is high and embraces
an element of uncertainty, a rational purchaser would prefer the
sweep technique only when he assumes that the illegitimate ad-
vantages he can obtain through it are large enough to offset
these costs. The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that the
advantages for the purchaser that ensue from preferring sweeps
over the other modes of acquisition are illegitimate. Therefore,
policymakers should take action to eliminate them.
B. The Sweep: A Superfluous Mode of Acquisition
It can be argued that a purchaser's decision to initiate a
sweep lies in the paucity of viable acquisition options: the pur-
chaser chooses the sweep-despite its faults-when he cannot
achieve his legitimate objectives by any other means. To support
this contention, it must be shown that the sweep presents an
acquisition option that is essentially different from the others
and that to exclude it from the menu of corporate control trans-
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actions would limit the variety of options available to the pur-
chaser whose motivation is positive.
The accepted modes of acquisition include merger, tender
offer, private purchase of control and purchase of all assets.
These can be classified according to two principles: legal tech-
nique or commercial outcome. In legal technique the mode of
acquisition can be consensual or hostile. When consensual, the
purchaser receives the blessings of the target corporation. When
hostile, he circumvents management and approaches the share-
holders behind the backs of the establishment (and often,
against its will). In the commercial outcome the mode of acquisi-
tion can transfer to the purchaser total ownership of the target
corporation (100 percent of its shares) or only partial ownership.
The application of these two criteria to a sweep will classify it as
a non-consensual form of acquisition, the commercial result of
which is partial ownership of the corporation. In light of this
characterization, there would appear to be no need to permit
sweeps as an alternative mode of acquisition.
When the purchaser is able to acquire control of the corpo-
ration by a consensual method, he will generally prefer to do
so. 8 Therefore, where the purchaser believes that his offer will
be welcomed by the target corporation, he will resort to a con-
sensual form of acquisition, like a merger. When the purchaser
assesses that any approach to the establishment of the target
corporation will be futile (or when his overtures have already
been rejected), three means of acquisition are available to him:
tender offer, private acquisition of the controlling block from the
person holding control or a sweep. In all three cases, the com-
mercial outcome of the technique will not change, since in each
technique, complete control of the corporation cannot be
achieved and, therefore, in the future, the buyer will need to
consider the interests of the minority shareholders. Nor do the
The chances of realizing a friendly transaction, such as a merger, are greater than
the chances of conducting a takeover not welcomed by the management. More impor-
tantly, in a friendly acquisition the purchaser conducts negotiations with the manage-
ment that is selling and, in the framework of these negotiations, the purchaser can de-
mand access to inside information on the corporation to enable the purchaser to assess
the benefits of the purchase from a position of knowledge. In a non-consensual acquisi-
tion, however, the purchaser has no access to the confidential data of the corporation and
must base commercial decisions on public information and unsubstantiated commercial
assessments.
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three modes of acquisition differ in their treatment of the sepa-
rate legal personality of the acquired corporation, in the consid-
eration that will be paid to the shareholders, in the scope of the
obligations that the purchaser assumes as a result of the acquisi-
tion, and in any of the other matters that customarily determine
the choice of mode of acquisition in a given situation. Therefore,
the sweep is superfluous, since it does not constitute a substan-
tive alternative to the modes of acquisition already regulated by
law.
CONCLUSION
The non-regulation of a street sweep under current law may
lie in the belief that since what is involved is a series of generally
small transactions that are governed by the principle of freedom
of contract, concern about any harmful effects is unwarranted.
This belief is misguided. A street sweep, like its more famous
siblings-merger, tender offer and private acquisition of control-
-can bring about transfers of control that will be detrimental to
corporate fairness and to economic efficiency.
A structural analysis of all the modes of acquisition of cor-
porate control reveals that a purchaser's preference for a street
sweep, rather than alternative modes, does not lie in any legiti-
mate advantageous commercial outcome. From the purchaser's
point of view, a sweep is an inferior and superfluous mode of
acquisition. The advantage of resorting to a street sweep is that
it allows the purchaser to acquire control without legislative in-
terference. A purchaser will prefer a street sweep when he is in-
terested in obtaining the commercial outcome that the merger,
tender offer or private acquisition can afford him, but wishes to
avoid the corresponding legislative responsibilities. The law
should not encourage such evasion. These legislative arrange-
ments have a great deal of internal logic designed to preserve
the delicate balance between the different parties to an acquisi-
tion transaction and to ensure corporate fairness vis-a-vis the
shareholders as well as the economic efficiency of the deal.
Therefore, this Article proposes the adoption of regulations
prohibiting acquisition of control by means of a sweep of shares.
The proposed prohibition on sweep acquisitions will force
all those interested in acquiring control to do so by means of one
of the techniques regulated by law to ensure that those involved
in the transaction know about the buyer's intention to negotiate
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control. Thus, the transaction will be disclosed to the forces of
competition in the market and the transfer of control to the
most efficient user will be assured. Similarly, removal of street
sweeps from the menu of options of acquisition will contribute
to the prevention of transactions made at the expense of the
selling shareholders or transactions that are detrimental to the
shareholders who remain a minority in the acquired corporation.

